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Abstract:  
In this essay, I examine Robert Boyle’s strategies for making imperceptible entities accessible 
to the senses. It is well known that, in his natural philosophy, Boyle confronted the challenge 
of making imperceptible particles of matter into objects of sensory experience. It has never been 
noted, however, that Boyle confronted a strikingly similar challenge in his natural theology – 
he needed to make an equally imperceptible God accessible to the senses. 
Taking this symmetrical difficulty as my starting point, I propose a new approach to thinking 
about the interconnections between Boyle’s natural philosophy and natural theology. For the 
most part, studies of science and religion in the early modern period work by seeking out the 
influence of explicitly stated religious beliefs on scientific ideas. I argue, by contrast, that we 
need to focus on Boyle’s representational practices, using his attempts to represent 
imperceptible entities as a means of uncovering metaphysical and theological presuppositions 
that he did not always articulate when stating his religious beliefs. 
With new interpretations of both A Discourse of Things Above Reason (1681) and Some 
Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection (1675), I show 
that there were crucial similarities between Boyle’s practices for representing both God and 
atoms. I go on to show, moreover, that Boyle used these practices to enact an ontological stance 
at odds with one his most important professed beliefs. 
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Introduction: 
From its origins in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Royal Society of London 
advocated an empirical approach to the production of natural knowledge. Natural philosophers 
such as Robert Boyle argued that sensory experience, tempered by the exercise of judgment, 
would provide the foundation for a reformed philosophy of nature. Boyle sought to use this 
empirical strategy, however, to understand entities that lay far beyond the grasp of the senses. 
According to the most widespread accounts of the mind’s inner workings, those objects were 
thought to be not just imperceptible, but completely unimaginable. 
 Consider first Boyle’s pneumatic and chemical experiments. With these experiments, 
he sought to establish the corpuscular hypothesis, which attributed the properties of perceptible 
material phenomena to mechanically configured interactions between imperceptible clusters – 
‘corpuscles’ – of infinitesimally small particles of matter. Even though Boyle regarded these 
particles as the most important objects of his experimental agenda, he nevertheless admitted 
their inaccessibility to the human faculties. In the Discourse of Things Above Reason (1681) he 
averred that the mind was unable to form images of particles so great in number, and so small 
in size: ‘so extraordinary a littleness not having fallen under any of our Senses, cannot truly be 
represented in our imagination’.1  
Now consider Boyle’s interest in using natural philosophy to find rational incentives for 
a belief in God. Like the naturalists John Ray (1627-1705) and Nehemiah Grew (1641-1712), 
he thought that the empirical investigation of nature could yield enough knowledge about God 
to form the basis of a new, empirical variety of natural theology, known by the name ‘physico-
theology’. All but the most heterodox thinkers of the seventeenth century agreed, however, that 
God was an entity at once infinite, and composed of an immaterial substance. This was a 
problem for natural philosophy, since none of his attributes, therefore, could be made accessible 
	 3	
to the finite, embodied organs of sensation, nor even to the immaterial-but-still-finite soul. An 
immaterial substance could never make impressions on the material organs of sensation, while 
an infinitely extended entity could never be represented as an object of experience. In Things 
Above Reason, Boyle therefore warned that it was ‘no less weakness than presumption to 
imagine that such finite Beings as our Souls, can frame full and adequate Idea’s’ of God’s 
infinite perfections. 2  In both natural philosophy and natural theology, therefore, Boyle 
addressed the difficulties arising from the desire to use the evidence of the senses to produce 
knowledge of imperceptible phenomena. 
 Seen in this light, the natural philosophy and physico-theology of the early Royal 
Society had much in common. Although they addressed different objects, both aimed to answer 
metaphysical questions – questions about the ultimate foundations of reality – by empirical 
means. However, the currently prevailing view is rather different. It holds that while natural 
philosophy and natural theology influenced one another a great deal, they nevertheless 
comprised distinct fields of activity. This view is expressed in two different ways. Scholars 
such as Scott Mandelbrote interpret the natural theology of the early Society primarily in 
apologetic terms. According to this reasoning, the use of evidence from nature to evince the 
existence and attributes of God served the purpose of deflecting accusations of religious 
impropriety, but had little to do with natural philosophy itself.3 Meanwhile, scholars such as 
Rhodri Lewis argue that the two fields were separated by their standards of proof and 
persuasion. As Lewis sees it, the purpose of natural philosophy was to produce knowledge of 
the physical world, while the aim of physico-theology was to induce belief in God.4 This line 
of thought gives us the impression that, while physico-theology depended in some measure on 
evidence from nature, it was chiefly the product of prior religious beliefs. It was the expression 
of a state of interior assent that could never have been acquired using the rational procedures of 
natural philosophy. 
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 These positions both imply, albeit for different reasons, that natural philosophers 
identified a sharp distinction between theology, a realm of religious belief, and natural 
philosophy, a realm of knowledge proper for scientific inquiry. I do not think, however, that 
Boyle and his contemporaries could have embraced so strict a demarcation. Peter Harrison and 
Jonathan Sheehan have both recently produced forceful reminders that seeing theology as a 
matter of irrationally acquired belief – rather than rationally acquired knowledge – is a modern 
idea. It is no untoward generalization to point out that, during the medieval and much of the 
early modern period, theology was often regarded as a science, as much capable of producing 
demonstrative truths as philosophy. During the seventeenth century, however, the scientific 
status of theology came under pressure, with thinkers such as Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza 
seeking to exclude an increasingly large number of theological questions from the domain of 
rational inquiry.5  Such efforts to consign theology to the realm of belief met with fierce 
resistance – not least on the part of many affiliated with the Royal Society. To pigeonhole the 
physico-theological work of philosophers including Boyle, Nehemiah Grew and John Ray as 
being concerned with mere belief would be, therefore, to take sides in what was at the time an 
unresolved debate. We must also recall that thinkers of the seventeenth century did not 
generally share today’s belief that the sciences are incapable of providing meaningful answers 
to metaphysical questions. As Quentin Meillassoux reminds us in his recent book After 
Finitude, metaphysics came to be seen as a matter for religious belief only after the 
interventions of David Hume and Immanuel Kant in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
By contrast, thinkers such as René Descartes – and as we shall see, Robert Boyle – regarded 
questions about the fundamental conditions of existence and the ontological status of both 
material and immaterial entities as legitimate targets for philosophical investigation.6 
 To avoid the anachronisms flowing from today’s distinctions between knowledge and 
belief, this essay will pursue an unusual approach to accessing the religious ‘content’ of Boyle’s 
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natural philosophy. It will not follow the widespread assumption that explicit statements of 
belief are the most reliable means of understanding the religious ideas at work in early modern 
natural philosophy. It will focus, instead, on Boyle’s representational practices, arguing that an 
analysis of his strategies for representing imperceptible entities – in works both of natural 
philosophy and theology – can enable us to identify the presence of theological and 
metaphysical concerns beyond the scope of his stated beliefs. This analysis will challenge the 
now canonical reading of Boyle’s Discourse of Things Above Reason offered some twenty years 
ago by Jan Wojcik. Wojcik’s reading holds that Boyle’s theological voluntarism – his belief 
that God’s relationship to creation was governed more by arbitrary will than by reason – led 
him to exclude theological questions from the domain of natural-philosophical inquiry. Boyle’s 
representational practices, however, reveal a more mixed picture. In works of both theology 
and natural philosophy, Boyle enacted with these practices an ontological stance quite at odds 
with his own voluntaristic beliefs. Nowhere are the tensions between these two ontologies made 
clearer than in Boyle’s Some Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the 
Resurrection (1675), an audacious attempt to subject one of the greatest Christian mysteries to 
the knowledge claims of natural philosophy. With a chemical experiment regarded as a decisive 
demonstration of the corpuscular hypothesis as its centrepiece, this work gives us a remarkable 
opportunity to see how Boyle mobilised strategies for representing imperceptible, unimaginable 
particles in his efforts to establish how much human reason could learn about an infinite God.  
 Focusing on Boyle’s strategies for representing imperceptible entities thus makes it 
possible to identify metaphysics and theology in aspects of his thought not explicitly concerned 
with religious belief. At the same time, it gives an opportunity to reconsider the relationship 
between Boyle’s approach to the production of theological knowledge, and those approaches 
pursued by fellow members of the Royal Society such as Grew and Ray. It is well known that 
Boyle’s theological beliefs – in particular, his beliefs about how God imposed his will on 
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creation – marked him out from his contemporaries. As I have suggested, however, it is not 
always productive to assume that theology in the  seventeenth century was the preserve of 
belief, or even that statements of religious belief are infallible guides to the religious ‘content’ 
of systems of natural philosophy. Focusing instead on Boyle’s representational practices, we 
will see that Boyle’s ontological assumptions were sometimes closer to those of his 
contemporaries than has often been assumed. Like Ray and Grew, he was caught between two 
almost contradictory desires, hoping to make God into an object of empirical knowledge while 
at the same time seeking to show that he was inaccessible to the human faculties. 
 
An Unimaginable God 
During the seventeenth century, the emergence of new accounts of the bodily organs of the 
mind raised difficult questions about how far God could be an object of human knowledge. 
Influential works of neurophysiology, such as Descartes’s Treatise on Man (posthumously 
published in 1662) and Thomas Willis’s Cerebri Anatome, cui accessit Nervorum Descriptio et 
Usus (1664), used mechanical terms to describe how the mind perceived and represented to 
itself the objects of sensory experience. Both Descartes and Willis regarded the ideas resulting 
from sensory experience as tiny material entities lodged in the brain.  Physical impressions 
made by external objects on the organs of sensation were, they claimed, transmitted through 
the nerves to an organ situated in the brain – an organ capable of turning those impressions into 
ideas to be surveyed by the immaterial soul. This organ was the imagination, understood as a 
material entity that functioned in the same way as a highly complex machine. Contemporaries 
disagreed about the extent of the imagination’s role in furnishing the mind with ideas and 
intuitions. Some argued that the mind was more or less wholly dependent on the objects of 
sensation and imagination, while others claimed that it also had access to a realm of immaterial 
	 7	
intuitions. But there was broad agreement about the nature of the imagination itself. 
Philosophers who differed as widely in their views as Hobbes, Descartes, and Boyle all agreed 
that the imagination was capable only of representing to itself ideas resulting from sensory 
experience. They agreed, moreover, that the imagination could never picture entities that were 
themselves incapable of palpably affecting the senses. Objects too large or small to make 
impressions on the sensory organs, or those composed of immaterial substances that could not 
touch those organs, were unimaginable. It thus seemed clear that God, an immaterial entity of 
infinite extent, was unimaginable too.7  
 Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes both drew on such accounts of the imagination as 
they sought, in differing ways, to limit the role of the sciences in producing knowledge of God. 
For Hobbes, everything in the universe – including thought itself – was the product of 
mechanical interactions between particles of matter. As a result, he held that the finite, bodily 
mechanisms of sensation and the imagination were the only instruments with which the mind 
could supply itself with ideas. He thus argued in Leviathan (1655) that the mind could never 
possess an idea of God: 
 
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of 
anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite 
magnitude; […] And therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us 
conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are 
unconceivable;) but that we may honour him.8 
 
For Hobbes, the finitude of the imagination made an infinite God completely unthinkable. By 
contrast, Descartes divided up the functions of the mind between its bodily organs and an 
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immaterial, immortal – albeit finite – soul. This soul, he claimed, could deduce the existence of 
an infinite God by purely intellective acts – acts that took place in a spiritual realm completely 
independent of the mechanisms involved with sensory experience. At the same time, however, 
Descartes concurred with Hobbes’s assessment of the imagination. In the Meditations and 
Objections and Replies he explained that the finite imagination, and its equally finite objects in 
the world of sensory experience, were incapable of revealing anything informative about the 
attributes of God. This position entailed an outright rejection of physico-theology, premised on 
the argument that its objects – natural phenomena accessible to the senses – were 
incommensurate with an infinite God. For Descartes, God could never be made into an object 
of aesthetic experience. Only the rational soul, performing intellective acts independent of 
experience, could apprehend any of God’s attributes.9  
 In many of their writings, Boyle and his contemporaries in the Royal Society gave the 
appearance of agreeing with what Descartes had said. In De Anima Brutorum quae Homine 
Vitalis ac Sensitiva est (1672), for example, Willis sought to show that the ‘rational soul’ could 
access ideas that were ‘by no means to be learnt from Sense or Phantasie [imagination]’. Among 
these ideas, he included some of the most important tenets of natural religion, including God’s 
infinity, the requirement to worship him, the existence of incorporeal beings such as angels, 
and the existence of heaven and hell.10 In Things Above Reason, meanwhile, Boyle used a 
similar line of thought to criticize Hobbes’s argument that immaterial entities were 
unintelligible simply because they could not be imagined: 
 
[…] those that are wont to employ their imaginations about things that are the 
proper Objects of the Intellect, are apt to pronounce things to be unconceivable, 
only because they find them unimaginable; as if the Fancy and the Intellect were 
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Faculties of the same extent: Upon which account some have so grossly err’d, 
as to deny all immaterial Substances […] 
  
Boyle identified Hobbes’s error as a failure to recognise the difference between the imagination 
and the intellect. He agreed that any attempt to represent immaterial entities with the 
imagination would end in failure. However, he did not agree that the imagination was the 
mind’s only faculty. Like Descartes, he claimed instead that the possession of an immaterial 
intellect enabled the mind to reason about incorporeal beings even though the organs involved 
with sensation and imagination could never apprehend them.11  
 It is clear that Boyle and his contemporaries were far more interested in using sensory 
experience to learn about God than they were sometimes willing to admit. Indeed, the naturalists 
Nehemiah Grew and John Ray remain famous to this day for their works of physico-theology, 
wherein they argued that the investigation of design in nature could yield reliable insights into 
some of God’s attributes and purposes. Meanwhile, Boyle argued for the value of physico-
theology in his Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688). In this work, he 
engaged closely with Descartes’s rejection of physico-theology, seeking to refute the French 
philosopher’s claim that all of God’s intentions lay equally concealed in the abyss of his infinite 
wisdom. He asserted instead that the design to be found in some natural phenomena was so 
‘manifest and obvious’ that it would be foolish to reject the insights to be gleaned from them 
about God’s wisdom and intentions. Indeed, he would claim in the Disquisition and elsewhere 
that practitioners of empirical natural philosophy could give a precise account of exactly how 
much wisdom God had displayed in the works of creation.12 
 Boyle and those of his contemporaries who committed themselves to physico-theology 
therefore held positions that seem contradictory. When answering the challenge posed by 
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materialist accounts of the mind, they emphasised the impossibility of subjecting an immaterial, 
infinite God to the bodily mechanisms of sensory experience. In the context of physico-
theology, however, they asserted that sensory experience was a highly effective means of giving 
the mind access to such a God. We are left to wonder how they could, if at all, reconcile such 
sharply contrasting positions.  
 
Robert Boyle Represents an Inconceivable God 
The Discourse of Things Above Reason was Boyle’s most highly developed reflection on the 
question of God’s accessibility to the human faculties. Examining this work in more detail will 
enable us to see how he attempted to balance the assertion of God’s unintelligibility against a 
desire to use the imagination and senses as instruments of theological knowledge. Although 
presented as a friendly dialogue between four participants, the book’s argument appears at first 
sight to be both clear and unambiguous. From the outset, however, it is worth pointing out that 
the clarity of Boyle’s argument was in some sense a rhetorical posture. As Michael Hunter has 
shown in his work on Boyle’s interest in casuistry, Boyle entertained private doubts that belied 
his public certainties.13 In Things Above Reason, Boyle argued that some matters lay completely 
beyond the reach of the human mind, inaccessible both to its bodily organs and to the immaterial 
soul. He described such matters as ‘things above reason’. This category included not only the 
nature of God and his attributes, but also points of doctrine that defeated rational explanation, 
such as the apparently irreconcilable coexistence of God’s necessary ability to know the 
outcome of every future event with the lived experience of free will and independent agency.14 
On closer inspection, however, Things Above Reason turns out to offer a remarkably ambiguous 
account of how the human faculties could reckon with such matters. 
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 Boyle’s aim was to persuade philosophically minded readers that they should embrace 
Christianity in spite of the fact that its revelations contained doctrines that defeated rational 
explanation or even comprehension. He made his case by reminding them how often they were 
willing to entertain similarly unintelligible notions – such as hypotheses about the forms and 
behaviour of imperceptible atoms – when it came to mathematics and natural philosophy. He 
therefore did not see matters of religious faith as the only ones that transcended the capacities 
of reason. He included in the same category paradoxes flowing from the contemplation of 
infinite numbers and quantities in both mathematics and natural philosophy, using them to 
illustrate the impossibility of understanding an equally infinite God. Boyle thus delineated three 
kinds of truth that he thought it necessary to accept, despite their evident unintelligibility – 
‘incomprehensible’, ‘inexplicable’, and ‘unsociable’. The infinite perfections of God were 
incomprehensible because the finite human faculties could never form adequate ideas of them. 
Meanwhile, inexplicable truths were those that could be perceived or intuited but not explained. 
Boyle illustrated this kind of truth using the paradox of the infinite divisibility of matter, a point 
that could be demonstrated mathematically but that defied physical explanation. Finally, 
unsociable truths – and here Boyle had in mind the difficulty of reconciling divine 
foreknowledge with the experience of free will – were those that appeared to contradict one 
another. He exemplified this final category by referring again to infinite divisibility, pointing 
out the apparent contradiction involved in the mathematical demonstration that lines of different 
lengths must nevertheless be divisible into the same infinite number of parts.15  
Since Boyle adopted an irenic authorial persona, addressing debates indirectly and 
rarely naming his opponents, it can be hard to identify the targets of his apologetic and 
controversial works. Nonetheless, Wojcik argues that Boyle saw Things Above Reason as an 
intervention in two contemporary theological debates. The first, which had been brewing in 
England since the 1650s, concerned the perceived threat of Socinianism. This was a brand of 
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theology that saw human reason as the criterion by which to judge the truth of scriptural 
revelation. Socinians thus rejected important Christian mysteries because they seemed 
impossible when subjected to rational scrutiny. Placing such mysteries beyond the grasp of 
reason enabled Boyle to neutralise this attack on revealed religion.16 At the same time, as 
Wojcik goes on to argue, Boyle sought to intervene in a recent outbreak of the interminable 
debate about predestination. For Calvinists, God’s necessary foreknowledge of future events 
implied that free will was more or less illusory – individuals were predestined for heaven or 
hell by divine decree. Opponents of this severe doctrine – such as the nonconformist divine 
John Howe, who wrote at Boyle’s urging – responded by arguing that such a strong account of 
predestination was inconsistent with God’s goodness because it made him responsible for 
human sin.17 Here, Boyle sought to calm disputes between rival groups of Protestants. By once 
again placing a matter of revealed religion outside the grasp of reason, he could hint at the 
futility of attempts to solve the paradoxes of predestination by rational means. Neither side, in 
Boyle’s view, could legitimately claim a greater share of truth than the other.18  
At one level, therefore, Wojcik explains Boyle’s position in terms his involvement with 
contemporary theological controversies. She goes on, however, to argue that there was an even 
more powerful agent at work – Boyle’s religious belief. She thus gives belief a causal status in 
Boyle’s thought, identifying it as the motivation not just for his theology, but also for his natural 
philosophy. ‘Boyle’s theological beliefs’, she writes, ‘provided the foundation for his views on 
natural philosophy’.19 It is well known that Boyle was committed to a position now referred to 
as theological voluntarism, a position that is usually contrasted – sometimes too sharply – with 
another view known as intellectualism. For an intellectualist such as the philosopher Henry 
More (1614-1687), the world could be understood through systems of reasoning – logic and 
mathematics, for example – because it was a stable product of divine wisdom, with God in some 
sense constrained by the logic of his own decrees. For voluntarists such as Boyle, on the other 
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hand, the world was utterly contingent on arbitrary decisions emanating from God’s free will. 
Boyle’s God could institute laws of nature, but might nevertheless choose to suspend those laws 
if, for instance, he wanted to communicate with humans through a supernatural sign – that is, a 
miracle. The role of voluntarism in Boyle’s epistemology, and indeed in the emergence of 
empiricism more broadly, is well established.20 To this familiar account, however, Wojcik adds 
an altogether more controversial claim. She argues that Boyle, extending the logic of 
voluntarism to his account of the human faculties, believed human and divine reason to operate 
according to entirely different principles. Thus Boyle’s belief in theological voluntarism led 
him to place human reason and divine wisdom into different ontological categories, making 
God wholly inaccessible to rational investigation.21 Moreover, Wojcik regards Boyle’s most 
important epistemological stance – the claim that natural philosophy was capable of yielding 
only probable knowledge rather than demonstrative certainty – as symptomatic of this deep-
seated irrationalism. She argues, in other words, that Boyle limited his experimental programme 
to the production of probable knowledge because he saw the world, and human reason itself, as 
contingent outcomes of God’s arbitrary will.22 
It is clear from Boyle’s stated argument in Things Above Reason that he held and 
expressed such a belief in God’s complete inaccessibility to human reason, premised at least in 
part on his radical voluntarism. It is less clear, however, that this belief decisively shaped his 
arguments about the conditions under which knowledge could be obtained, whether of God or 
the natural world. When, for instance, he turned to examples from natural philosophy to 
illustrate the mind’s encounter with God, the resulting arguments were ambiguous. Let us 
consider a passage from the second half of Things Above Reason where Boyle, for the second 
time, compared the intellect’s inability to grasp God’s attributes with the imagination’s inability 
to picture countless infinitesimally small atoms: 
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I see no necessity, That Intelligibility to a humane Understanding, should be 
necessary to the Truth or Existence of a thing; any more then that Visibility to a 
Humane Eye, should be necessary to the Existence of an Atome, or of a 
Corpuscle of Air, or of the Effluvium’s of a Loadstone, or the Fragrant 
Exhalations of Ambergris, and Musk from a perfumed Glove […].23 
 
As we saw at the very start of this essay, Boyle and his contemporaries frequently discussed the 
impossibility of experiencing or imagining imperceptibly small particles of matter. Indeed, they 
held up the imagination’s inability to picture the enormous number of atoms making up even 
the smallest perceptible things as an appropriate analogue for the intellect’s inability to grasp 
God’s infinite perfections. In his Cosmologia Sacra (1701), for example, the botanist and 
physico-theologian Nehemiah Grew used the inconceivable divisibility of matter, infinite for 
all practical purposes, as an illustration of how ‘deeply and far out of sight’ God had hidden 
‘the Foundation of the Generations and Operations of Bodies’.24 The comparison between 
atoms and God might therefore be cited as an expression of Boyle’s radical voluntarism, with 
its emphasis on the impossibility of perceiving atoms interpreted as a reminder of the 
discrepancy between human reason and God’s agency.25  
 Boyle’s own explanation, given a page later, gives us quite a different sense of his 
intentions. He  clarifies his meaning by mobilising another comparison from the domain of 
philosophy, this time invoking geometry: 
 
[…] there is no necessity that we should be interdicted all Knowledge of those 
sublime Objects, in which there are many things, whereof […] we must confess 
our selves ignorant. Thus elder Geometricians knew very well what a 
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Rectangular Triangle was, when they conceived it to be a Figure consisting of 
three strait Lines, two of which comprize a right Angle; though probably for a 
great while they did not know so much as all its chief Properties or Affections 
[…].26  
 
Geometricians before Pythagoras knew exactly what a right-angled triangle was – a triangle 
with a 90-degree angle in one of its corners – even though they had not yet worked out that the 
square of the hypotenuse was equal to the sum of the squares of the remaining two sides. For 
Boyle, therefore, the history of geometry showed that accurate and useful knowledge of an 
object did not have to depend on a complete intellectual or imaginative grasp of all its 
properties. Extending this line of thought to the ‘sublime Objects’ of theology, Boyle hinted 
that knowledge of God was possible after all. The human faculties could obtain partial but 
nonetheless reliable knowledge of God’s attributes, even though it would never grasp them 
entirely. As Alan Chalmers has disapprovingly pointed out, moreover, Boyle asserted the value 
of such incomplete explanations when dealing more directly with the mechanical philosophy. 
In his essay ‘About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis’ (1674), for 
instance, Boyle argued that hypotheses that failed to explain phenomena in terms of first 
principles could nevertheless provide the mind with partial insights that were both pleasing and 
useful.27  
 Boyle gave several indications, moreover, that he thought it possible to make God 
himself into an object of sensory experience. Consider, for instance, his treatment of a thought 
experiment from the sixth of Descartes’s Meditations. Descartes began by pointing out that it 
was easy both to understand and to form a mental image of a three-sided figure: ‘not only do I 
understand it to be a shape enclosed by three lines, but at the same time, with the eye of the 
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mind, I contemplate the three lines as present, and this is what I call imagining’. Such was not 
the case, however, when it came to shapes with many more sides. It was easy enough to 
understand that a chiliogon was a figure with a thousand sides. It was evidently impossible, 
however, to form an accurate mental image of such a complex shape. ‘I may perhaps picture 
some figure to myself in a confused fashion’, Descartes explained, ‘[but] it is quite clear that 
this is not a chiliogon, because it is not at all different from the picture I would also form […] 
if I were thinking about a myriogon, or some other many-sided figure’. In other words, the 
intellect could understand complex phenomena even when the imagination was incapable of 
picturing them. For Descartes, therefore, the contemplation of many-sided polygons served to 
demonstrate that there was a fundamental ontological distinction between the intellect and the 
imagination. The intellect was an immaterial entity that did not depend upon the bodily faculties 
of the mind – the senses and the imagination – for its existence.28 
 As we saw earlier, Boyle had in fact embraced this distinction at another point in the 
text, mobilising it to attack Hobbes’s argument for the impossibility of possessing intelligible 
ideas of God. At this point, however, he glossed over that crucial distinction, instead making 
an argument that depended on identifying similarities between the two faculties. He proposed 
to explain the immaterial intellect’s encounter with God by likening it to the imagination’s 
encounters with material things: 
 
’Tis scarce possible to find very apposite examples, to illustrate things of a kind 
so abstruse and heteroclite as those may well be suppos'd, that do surpass our 
Reason. But yet some assistance may be borrowed from what we may observe 
in that other faculty of the mind, which is most of kin to the Intellect, I mean 
the Imagination […].29 
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Asserting the kinship between the intellect and the imagination enabled Boyle to put 
Descartes’s demonstration of the weaknesses of the imagination to a new purpose. He agreed 
that the imagination stood no chance of forming a complete, intelligible image of a figure like 
the myriogon: the result would be nothing more than ‘a confused Idea of a Polygon with a very 
great many sides’. Unlike Descartes, however, Boyle asserted that the imagination’s inability 
to picture such an object could serve as an informative stand-in for the manner in which the 
intellect was overpowered in its reckoning with God.30 
 All the way through Things Above Reason, Boyle used comparisons of the same kind to 
illustrate the mind’s encounter with God. In several places, for instance, he compared that 
encounter to what happened when the eye had to reckon with objects that could not be distinctly 
seen. In one case, he used the image of a mariner catching sight of land for the first time. The 
mariner might not know exactly what type of land he would find when he got closer to the shore 
– whether it would turn out to be rocky or inhabited – but he could nevertheless be satisfied 
with the partial insight that it was land and not sea. At the same time, he likened the intellect’s 
encounter with God to the eye’s inability to grasp objects too large to be seen in one view. It 
was impossible, he noted in one of these comparisons, for the unaided eye to perceive the full 
extent of an ocean. As Boyle explained, however, no reasonable observer would count the eye’s 
weakness as a good reason for denying that the rest of the ocean existed, and that it was truly a 
vast object. Instead, he pointed out that a sensible observer would realise that what he could see 
was merely a small part of something much larger – an enormous body of water ‘which may, 
for ought he knows, reach to a vast extent beyond the visible Horizon’.31 As we can see, these 
comparisons had mixed meanings. On the one hand, they held up the imagination’s inability to 
reckon with extremely large or distant objects as an illustration of the intellect’s inability to 
reason about an infinite God. On the other hand, they undercut this message by signalling that 
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the imagination’s encounters with some objects could serve as a model for grasping, if only in 
a partial sense, what God’s attributes were like. The repeated appearance of such comparisons 
gives us a sense, therefore, that Boyle regarded the imagination and its objects in the world of 
perceptible, material finite things as informative analogues for the immaterial intellect’s 
encounter with an infinite God. 
 We cannot therefore regard Things Above Reason as a straightforward expression of 
Boyle’s belief in the radical contingency of the world and God’s total inaccessibility to the 
material parts of the mind. His attempts to represent the mind’s encounters with God instead 
opened a contradictory possibility – that the imagination could enable the intellect to obtain 
useful knowledge of God’s nature and attributes. At times this possibility, latent in Boyle’s 
comparisons, floated to the surface of his diffusely expressed argument. Consider for instance 
his summing up of the lessons to be drawn from the comparison between the imagination and 
the intellect: 
 
So when we speak of Gods Primity (if I may so call it)[,] Omnipotence, and 
some other of his infinite Attributes and Perfections, we have some conceptions 
of the things we speak of, but may very well discern them to be but inadequate 
ones 
 
Boyle did not claim here that the human faculties were totally incapable of reckoning with God. 
Rather, he qualified the argument he had been making up to that point with the proviso that the 
mind could possess ‘some conceptions’, however limited, of things above reason. He added this 
qualification, moreover, at several other points in the work. When discussing eternity, for 
example, he remarked that ‘a considering person’ could obtain a limited notion of infinite 
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duration by contemplating extremely long – but nevertheless finite – periods of time. In these 
moments, Boyle carefully distinguished his argument for the mind’s inability to possess 
adequate ideas of an infinite God from the harsher alternative that it could possess no ideas at 
all. Instead of following Hobbes’s assertion that the mind’s encounter with God would result in 
complete and utter confusion, he suggested that the senses and imagination could somehow 
furnish the mind with ideas bearing some relation to the attributes of God.32  
 We can now understand Boyle’s case. His main aim was to resist the Socinian argument 
that revealed religion should be judged according to the strictures of human reason. For much 
of the work, he therefore sought to place God safely beyond the grasp of rational 
comprehension, mobilising the argument that there be no relation whatsoever between infinites 
and the finite objects of sensory (or even intellectual) experience. He subverted that argument, 
however, with his comparisons. Those comparisons opened an opposing possibility – that the 
finite objects to be found among the things that God had created could, after all, yield insights 
commensurate in some degree to the attributes of an infinite, immaterial God.33 An explanation 
for the tension between these two positions might be found by putting Boyle’s desire to secure 
sacred mysteries from the prying eyes of reason in a broader context. In Final Causes, as we 
have already seen, Boyle manifested an equally strong commitment to resisting the implication 
that natural philosophy could do nothing at all for theology. He did not want to concede 
Descartes’s argument that experiments and observations could reveal nothing at all of God’s 
attributes and purposes. It is therefore perhaps not entirely surprising that, even in his most 
concerted effort to delineate the limits of the human faculties, he held on to the notion that God 
could be an object of aesthetic experience – if only to a limited extent. In doing so, I would 
suggest, he kept open the possibility of using the practices of empiricism to gain theological 
knowledge, in spite of God’s ultimate unintelligibility. 
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A Chemical Resurrection 
Boyle’s attempt to keep open a small space for physico-theology was not, however, a mere 
apologetic stratagem, deployed without regard to its consistency with his broader system of 
thought. We have already encountered evidence to suggest that he and his contemporaries 
identified important overlaps between the task of representing atoms and that of representing 
God. Recall that both Boyle and Grew held up the imagination’s encounter with an almost 
infinitely large number of imperceptibly small atoms as an instructive analogue for the mind’s 
encounter with God. It therefore makes sense to embark on a deeper inquiry into the possible 
connections between their strategies for bringing atoms into the realm of sensory experience 
and their attempts to do just the same thing with God. 
 It is true that in Things Above Reason Boyle used the impossibility of imagining atoms 
to illustrate the impossibility of completely grasping the attributes of God. His point, as we have 
seen, was that natural philosophers willing to accept the existence of inconceivable atoms 
should not turn up their noses at the possibility of an equally inconceivable God. It is abundantly 
clear, however, that he and his contemporaries did not admit the unintelligibility of atoms in 
order to exclude them from the realm of rational inquiry. Instead – as is well known – they 
claimed that observations on the objects of sensory experience could yield a partial but 
nonetheless highly probable kind of knowledge about the forms and motions of those 
particles.34 Boyle and his contemporaries were, moreover, aware of the resulting paradox. As 
they understood it, the aim of the empirical project was to drag entities that could be neither 
perceived nor imagined into the realm of sensory experience. In the first of his Three Physico-
Theological Discourses (1693), for instance, John Ray was moved to praise Boyle’s chemical 
experiments for their strange ability to do just that. ‘But for a sensible [perceptible] 
demonstration of the unconceivable, I had almost said infinite, divisibility of matter’, he wrote, 
‘I might refer the Reader to the Honourable Mr. Boyl of famous memory his Discourse 
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concerning the strange subtlety of effluviums’.35 Here we can see a broad point of coherence 
between the natural-philosophical project of representing atoms and the physico-theological 
project of representing God. When Boyle likened God’s infinite extent to finite objects such as 
the ocean or the coastline, he was mobilising the same basic assertion at work in natural 
philosophy – that objects of sensory experience could somehow stand in for entities that were, 
by their very definition, impossible to experience. To borrow Ray’s powerful turn of phrase, 
we might therefore say that Boyle was attempting to give his readers a ‘sensible demonstration’ 
of God’s ‘unconceivable’ attributes. 
 In other works, both theological and natural-philosophical, Boyle made much more 
explicit claims about the theological insights to be gained from representations of imperceptible 
particles. Perhaps the most striking – and least studied – of them all is Some Physico-
Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection. This short text appeared 
as an addition to Some Considerations about The Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion 
(1675), a much longer treatise that floated many of the same arguments that would receive a 
fuller airing some six years later Things Above Reason. Most works of physico-theology 
concerned themselves exclusively with natural religion, seeking only to demonstrate God’s 
existence and activity in the world. By contrast, Boyle’s Possibility of the Resurrection deals 
explicitly with a point of revealed religion – the promised re-composition of every human body 
at the end of time. The work therefore fell outside the mainstream, belonging to that speculative 
branch of physico-theology, exemplified by Ray’s Three Physico-Theological Discourses, 
concerned with providential events that seemed to depend, at least in part, on physical causes – 
events such as the deluge and the earth’s promised destruction at the end of time. Although the 
work was a little unusual, Boyle’s polemical agenda was, as Salvatore Ricciardo has recently 
shown, a familiar one. His polemical targets in Possibility of the Resurrection were the same as 
the ones he would go on to tackle in Things Above Reason. He wanted to resist the notion that 
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revelation could be judged by exclusively rational means while at the same time demonstrating 
the theological utility of his own brand of atomistic natural philosophy.36  
 In line with the first of these aims, Boyle framed his discussion as a response to those 
who rejected the promise of the resurrection because they regarded it as impossible. For Boyle, 
one of the strongest such objections to the possibility of the resurrection was that human bodies 
decompose after death, their matter being widely dispersed and finally incorporated into the 
bodies of other substances, plants and animals. God was therefore left with a seemingly 
insurmountable difficulty. To re-compose every human body that had ever lived, he would first 
need to extricate the immense number of ‘scattered parts’ that had once made them up from all 
the new substances to which they had been joined. After that, he still had the task of 
reconstituting all those particles ‘after the same manner wherein they existed’ before.37 With 
the title Possibility of the Resurrection, Boyle made it clear that he would respond to this 
objection neither by seeking to describe exactly how the resurrection could take place, nor by 
attempting to prove that it could be explained in entirely natural terms. Instead, he carefully 
signalled his belief that so momentous an occurrence could only be regarded as an unintelligible 
effect of God’s absolute and unfettered wisdom, will and power. Admitting the ultimate 
incomprehensibility of the resurrection did not, however, lead him to make it a matter for faith 
alone. Instead, he argued that a limited kind of knowledge could still be obtained – not enough 
to explain how the resurrection would come about, but sufficient at least to disabuse those who 
rejected the doctrine because they regarded it as a complete impossibility. If natural philosophy 
could not explain the resurrection in detail, it could nevertheless produce a demonstration that 
the process was physically possible.38 
Here Boyle saw an opportunity to exploit the main explanatory resource of his 
corpuscular hypothesis – the claim that transformations in the perceptible qualities of material 
things were caused by changes in the composition and motions of imperceptible, semi-
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permanent clusters of atoms called corpuscles. Using this framework, he could argue that the 
incorporation of one substance into another involved neither transformation nor destruction at 
the corpuscular level. The corpuscles making up human bodies remained present through the 
whole process, merely concealed by being temporarily arranged with those of other substances 
to produce different sensory effects. By way of example, he cited cases where sensory evidence 
seemed to indicate the continued presence of corpuscles that had been incorporated into other 
substances, noting for instance that the purple colour of juniper berries could be imparted to the 
flesh of pigs that fed on them.39 Such examples, however, only represented half of the process 
presumed necessary. He needed a visible phenomenon capable of evidencing not just the 
persistence of corpuscles in other substances, but also the possibility that they could be 
recomposed just as they had been before. 
Boyle found this phenomenon in a chemical experiment known as the ‘reduction to the 
pristine state’. A decade beforehand, he had made prominent use of a version of that experiment, 
involving camphor, in The Origine of Formes and Qualities (1666). In this text, he mobilised 
experimental observations both to attack scholastic theories of matter and to urge the acceptance 
of his mechanical, corpuscular hypothesis in their place. Boyle saw the camphor reduction as a 
decisively powerful piece of perceptible evidence both for the existence of his corpuscles, and 
for the mechanical quality of the interactions between them. To grasp the significance of 
Boyle’s use of the camphor reduction in his discussion of the resurrection, we must therefore 
first examine how he used it in Formes and Qualities to bring inconceivably small corpuscles 
into the realm of sensory experience. 
To begin, Boyle took a quantity of camphor and mixed it with oil of vitriol (concentrated 
sulphuric acid) to produce an odourless, reddish solution. As he carefully explained, this 
solution had none of the original qualities that could be perceived in camphor – a white colour, 
strong smell and brittle texture. When he added water to the mixture, however, an exothermic 
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reaction took place. Shortly thereafter the camphor began to precipitate out of the solution and 
back into view: 
 
if into this Liquor you pour a due quantity of fair Water, you will see (perhaps 
not without delight) that, in a trice, the Liquor will become pale, almost as at the 
first, and the Camphire, that lay conceal'd in the pores of the Menstruum, will 
immediately disclose it self, and emerge, in its own nature and pristine form of 
white floating and combustible Camphire, which will fill […] the Air with its 
strong and Diffusive Odour.40  
 
Describing the experiment’s outcome, Boyle carefully noted that the substance that emerged 
from the solution possessed exactly the same perceptible qualities – colour, texture, 
flammability and aroma – as the camphor had had at the start. As far as the human senses could 
discern, the reduction to the pristine state presented the disappearance and subsequent perfect 
reappearance of the substance. It is perhaps not hard to see why Boyle came to see this 
experiment, culminating in the instant recovery of a substance from apparent annihilation, as 
an analogue for the resurrection itself. 
 William R. Newman has shown that Boyle regarded the reduction to the pristine state 
as a particularly effective demonstration of the corpuscular hypothesis. For Boyle, the evident 
reappearance of camphor at the experiment’s end made it reasonable to infer that the same 
substance had also been present when concealed from the senses through its mixture with 
sulphuric acid. The camphor reduction thus served as an empirical demonstration that a 
substance had persisted in an imperceptible state. With this demonstration, Boyle could in turn 
argue that all substances were composed of corpuscles – semi-permanent clusters of atoms so 
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small as to be imperceptible when disaggregated from one another and joined to those of other 
substances.41 At the same time, Boyle regarded the experiment as an empirical demonstration 
that those imperceptible corpuscles moved and interacted in a mechanical fashion. Consider, 
for instance, his reasoning about the physical causes of camphor’s strong scent. For Boyle, the 
fact that the scent of camphor could be eliminated and subsequently restored by two odourless 
compounds – oil of vitriol and water – suggested that odour was not a real property of bodies. 
He proposed instead that it was an effect worked upon the senses by changes in the size, shape, 
motions and resulting texture of particles as they were placed mechanically into varying 
combinations. He established this point by means of a markedly anthropocentric strategy. Boyle 
had effected a complete transformation in the perceptible qualities of camphor, including of 
course its scent, through the simple mechanical act of mixing it with other substances. It seemed 
likely to him, therefore, that analogous mechanical processes were at play among the corpuscles 
themselves. He inferred the workings of an invisible mechanism from mechanical operations 
that he had himself performed.42 
 Before returning to Boyle’s use of the experiment in Possibility of the Resurrection, it 
is worth pausing for a while to reflect on how the camphor reduction worked as a strategy for 
bringing otherwise imperceptible entities into the field of sensory experience. The crucial point 
to make on this score is that the perceptible phenomena did not in fact provide direct evidence 
for the things they purportedly demonstrated. Boyle could hardly rely on direct observation to 
demonstrate that the interactions between imperceptible corpuscles took place in a mechanical 
fashion. Instead, he worked by assuming that phenomena accessible to the senses and 
imagination – in this case, his own experimental interventions – could stand in for and yield 
knowledge of the otherwise inconceivable processes going on at the microscopic level. Now, it 
is well known that Boyle favoured explanations based on the workings of visible phenomena 
that could be thought to work by mechanical means because he regarded them as more 
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intelligible than those offered by rival schools of thought. Indeed, he made a point of judging 
hypotheses about physical phenomena according to their intelligibility, admitting only those 
that could be readily grasped by the human faculties. In Formes and Qualities he dismissed 
scholastic explanations for chemical transformations by arguing that their unintelligibility made 
them worthless. His point was not just that the imagination would be forever unable to grasp 
the immaterial agents – known as ‘substantial forms’ – so important to scholastic theories of 
matter. Rather, he asserted that an unintelligible explanation was in fact no explanation at all, 
asking sarcastically asking how ‘Incomprehensible […] substantial forms’ could ‘explain 
intelligibly This or That particular Phaenomenon?’ At the same time, he premised the 
superiority of his own explanations on the comparative ease with which the senses could grasp, 
and the imagination could picture, the workings of visible mechanical phenomena.43 
 In line with her broader thesis, Wojcik interprets Boyle’s emphasis on the intelligibility 
of the mechanical hypothesis as an indication that he did not necessarily regard it as a truthful 
account of the world as God had created it.44 It is of course true that Boyle understood the 
probabilistic knowledge resulting from experiments and observations to be provisional, and 
therefore apt to be modified or refuted in the future. It is also true, as we saw in Things Above 
Reason, that he believed God to be quite capable of constructing the world in a manner that did 
not match up either with what humans had discovered of it, or were capable of understanding.45 
Notwithstanding these admissions, Boyle nevertheless argued that natural philosophy could 
reveal real truths about God’s creation. A good example of this contradictory tendency is to be 
found in Formes and Qualities itself. Boyle opened the work by announcing his intention to 
frame a purely hypothetical account of how chemical transformations might be brought about. 
Soon, however, he changed his tone, repeatedly asserting that his micro-mechanical account of 
physical causation was in fact – in all likelihood – a true statement of how nature actually 
worked. When he got to the camphor reduction, he did not stop at identifying the corpuscular 
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hypothesis as an explanation of how changes in odour might conceivably be brought about. 
Instead, he bluntly stated that what the human nose understood as changes in odour were caused 
by changes in the ‘Texture’ of corpuscles when they came to be aggregated and disaggregated 
in differing combinations. By this stage, Boyle was asserting the truth of the corpuscular 
hypothesis, arguing that the world of imperceptible corpuscles actually operated according to 
the same principles observable in phenomena more readily accessible to sensory experience.46  
 In Possibility of the Resurrection, by contrast, Boyle stuck to the more modest aim of 
obtaining a plausible account of how an occurrence like the resurrection might be brought 
about. He sought, as we have seen, only to establish that such an event was a possibility – that 
it did not run contrary to reason even though an exact or thorough explanation for its operations 
could never be obtained. As Boyle saw it, the way to accomplish this end was by showing not 
only that processes like the resurrection were to be found in the realm of sensory experience, 
but also that those processes were readily accessible to sensory experience. He therefore ran 
through several potential analogues for the resurrection, including experiments purporting to 
show the palingenesis of plants from their burnt ashes, before finally coming to a detailed 
account of the camphor reduction.47 As in Formes and Qualities, Boyle once again held up the 
camphor reduction as a demonstration that substances were composed of infinitesimally small 
corpuscles, and that perceptible changes in their qualities were caused by mechanical alterations 
to the configuration of those corpuscles. The camphor’s reappearance at the experiment’s end 
was to be understood as the result of using water to mechanically separate the camphor 
corpuscles from those of sulphuric acid, and to return them to their original configuration.48 
 Equipped with experimental evidence for a similar process, Boyle moved to establish 
the possibility of the resurrection itself. He proposed that God could – if he so chose – use a 
similar method to reconstitute each and every human body ahead of judgment day: 
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Since, I say, these things are so, why should it be impossible, that a most 
intelligent Agent […] should be able so to order and watch the article of a 
Humane Body, as that partly of those that remain in the Bones, and partly of 
those that copiously flie away by insensible Transpiration, and partly of those 
that are otherwise disposed of upon their resolution, a competent number may 
be preserved or retrieved; so that stripping them of their disguises, or extricating 
them from other parts of Matter, to which they may happen to be conjoined, he 
may reunite them betwixt themselves, and, if need be, with particles of Matter 
fit to be contexted with them, and thereby restore or reproduce a Body , which, 
being united with the former Soul, may, in a sense consonant to the expressions 
of Scripture, recompose the same Man, whose Soul and Body were formerly 
disjoined by Death.49 
 
With these words, Boyle pictured the resurrection as a more complex version of the camphor 
reduction. He imagined God as a transcendently skilled chemist, reversing the decomposition 
of human bodies by extricating their corpuscles from the new substances into which they had 
been incorporated, and then reconstituting them in their original configurations. If a human 
could recover camphor from its apparent destruction through a series of simple mechanical 
interventions, then it stood to reason that a much wiser and more powerful agent could 
accomplish the same thing on a much grander scale.50 
 Boyle made the resurrection into a partial object of knowledge, using a strategy entirely 
consistent with his approach to the representation of imperceptible particles. In each case, he 
asserted that objects accessible to sensory experience could be made to stand in for entities that 
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would otherwise remain inconceivable. He thus asserted that comparisons between 
imperceptible entities and the objects of sensory experience were both possible, and capable of 
yielding reliable insights. Boyle’s interpretation of the physical causes of the camphor reduction 
depended, after all, on a presumption of ontological similarity not only between perceptible and 
imperceptible phenomena, but also between his own experimental interventions and the 
processes he believed to be going on at the corpuscular level. Although Boyle sought a lower 
grade of certainty when it came to the resurrection, he nevertheless used the same strategy to 
make it into an object of knowledge. The only difference was that he extended the ontological 
scope of the comparison even further, applying it not only to the experiment’s physical causes, 
but also to the processes involved with the resurrection itself. The entire premise of his 
argument was that the imperceptible physical processes supposedly revealed by the experiment 
could be made to somehow stand in for – and yield knowledge of – the supernatural, 
unintelligible event promised in the Bible. Boyle’s outwardly modest claim to be demonstrating 
nothing more than the possibility of the resurrection therefore concealed a remarkably 
ambitious attempt to demonstrate the theological potential of experimental natural philosophy. 
 
Conclusions: Metaphysics, Theology and Representation  
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Immanuel Kant argued that the human mind was 
incapable of gaining knowledge about the metaphysical status of things external to it. As Kant 
saw it, the mind’s reasoning about things was necessarily a function of its relation to those 
things. The mind could therefore gain access to things as they exist for us, but was left incapable 
of finding much out about things as they exist for themselves. It was this line of thought that led 
him to regard metaphysical and theological questions as matters for belief rather than 
knowledge. For Kant, the sciences could produce few answers to metaphysical questions 
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because there was simply no way to escape the relational quality of the mind’s reasoning.51 
Perhaps the strangest consequence of focusing excessively on Boyle’s voluntarism is that it 
makes his attitude to the boundaries between knowledge and belief look very much like Kant’s 
characteristically modern position. On Wojcik’s reading, Boyle’s belief in a world contingent 
on God’s arbitrary will led him to abandon the possibility of using natural philosophy to obtain 
true knowledge about its ultimate causes. Long before the philosophical revolutions of Hume 
and Kant, you might say, Boyle’s religious beliefs led him, perversely, to adopt a more or less 
modern outlook on the role of the sciences in relation to metaphysics and theology. 
Boyle’s representational practices, however, reveal a different picture. He used a 
comparative strategy to make unimaginable entities conceivable, dragging them from the realm 
of imperceptible entities into the realm of things accessible to sensory experience. Such an 
approach was at odds with his own belief in a world made thoroughly inaccessible to the human 
faculties by its dependence on God’s arbitrary will and unlimited power. Instead, his 
comparisons bespeak a world in which there was continuity between God, human faculties, and 
the rest of creation – a world in which phenomena accessible to the senses could stand in for, 
and reliably lead to knowledge of, the inconceivable entities beyond them. In the preface to one 
of his last-published works, The Christian Virtuoso (1690), Boyle came close to making this 
point explicit: 
 
Apposite Comparisons do not only give Light, but Strength, to the Passages they 
belong to, since they are not always bare Pictures and Resemblances, but a kind 
of Arguments; being oftentimes, if I may so call them, Analogous Instances, 
which do declare the Nature, or Way of Operating, of the Thing they relate to, 
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and by that means do in a sort prove, that, as ’tis possible, so it is not improbable, 
that the Thing may be such as ’tis represented:52 
 
To readers of the seventeenth century, comparisons were generally seen as figures of rhetoric, 
appropriate to poetry and persuasive forms of speech, but out of place when the circumstances 
called for philosophical precision.53 Justifying his frequent use of comparisons in precisely such 
circumstances, Boyle turned to the same logic behind his use of the camphor reduction to 
establish the possibility of the resurrection. A well-chosen comparison could, he suggested, do 
the work of a philosophical analogy, helping not only to produce a powerful image but also to 
explain the phenomenon in question. Boyle thus positioned the comparison as an instrument 
for making the wisdom of God accessible to the imagination. To demonstrate the possibility 
that an unknown phenomenon acted in a certain manner, it was necessary only to find a similar 
process that could be represented in terms more readily accessible to sensory experience and its 
corollaries in the imagination.54 
 None of this is to deny that Boyle’s radical voluntarism put him at odds with 
contemporaries who also pursued physico-theology. It is safe to say that both Nehemiah Grew 
and John Ray, for instance, held slightly more ‘intellectualist’ positions, regarding the world 
more as an emanation of God’s reason, and therefore more open to the human faculties. As 
Scott Mandelbrote has noted, both Ray and Grew were far more comfortable than Boyle with 
the idea that the study of nature could reveal the wisdom of God. Works such as Ray’s The 
Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691) and Grew’s Cosmologia Sacra thus 
eschew Boyle’s emphasis on God’s unlimited power and freedom of will in favour of an 
emphasis on the world’s orderliness and intelligibility.55 One result of this emphasis on God’s 
reason, as Peter Harrison has shown, was that Grew adopted a markedly different position on 
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the relationship between miracles and the laws of nature. He could not accept Boyle’s 
suggestion that God was free simply to suspend the laws of nature to make miracles happen. 
Instead, he took the view that occurrences such as the plagues inflicted on Egypt to encourage 
the Pharaoh to release his Israelite captives were brought about by extremely long chains of 
natural causes, implanted in the world by God at the beginning of time and scheduled to 
coincide with moments when humanity had need of a divine message.56 
 Despite such differences, however, the three naturalists used strikingly similar strategies 
– and similar ontological assumptions – when it came to imperceptible entities. Drawing on his 
earlier work dealing with the saline chemistry of plants, for instance, Grew argued in his 
Cosmologia Sacra that the order of the atomic world could be safely inferred from the order so 
readily apparent to him in perceptible phenomena. Immediately afterwards, however, he used 
a similar argument to show that God was responsible for creating that order: 
 
Now Regularity, which is certain; cannot depend upon Chance, which is 
Uncertain. For that were to make Uncertainty, the Cause of Certainty. […] It is 
therefore evident, That as Matter and Motion; so the Cizes [sic.] and figures, of 
the Parts of Matter, have their Original from a Divine Regulator. 
 
Let us spell out exactly what Grew was suggesting here. It was not merely that the behaviour 
of imperceptible-but-material atoms could be inferred from the behaviour of material things 
open to the senses. Rather it was that the same phenomena could also shine a light on the 
attributes and intentions of an imperceptible, immaterial, and infinite God. This was a position, 
moreover, that Ray anticipated in a letter that he wrote in 1685 to Tancred Robinson, wherein 
he similarly argued that the regularity observable in visible saline particles was a compelling 
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argument for regularity among atoms. Both Grew and Ray assumed, therefore, that things 
accessible to the senses and imagination could stand in for imperceptible entities of uncertain 
ontological status. Like Boyle, they assumed that there was enough continuity between the 
perceptible and imperceptible parts of the world – including the human faculties and the mind 
of God – for the world of experience to stand in for the wisdom of God.57 
 Today’s distinctions between the realms of belief and knowledge are an impediment to 
understanding the connections between theology and natural philosophy at the end of the 
seventeenth century. No doubt, Boyle’s efforts to determine how far the mind could apprehend 
unintelligible entities show us that he was interested in identifying the boundaries between 
them. Yet the epistemological categories of belief and knowledge did not, for him, match up 
squarely with the disciplinary categories of theology and natural philosophy. Despite his radical 
voluntarism, Boyle thought it possible not only to gain a limited kind of knowledge about God’s 
attributes and intentions, but also to accomplish this task using the representational and 
investigative strategies of empirical natural philosophy. Shifting our analytical focus away from 
explicit statements of belief is therefore neither to deny nor diminish the importance of religious 
ideas and practices in natural philosophy. Rather, it is to recognise that much of the religious 
‘content’ of Boyle’s thought is to be found in not only in statements of what he believed, but 
also in the practices through which he made things accessible to the organs of sensory and 
imaginative experience. 
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